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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
LAWRENCE BUTTERFIELD, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
DONALD G. CHANEY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 9413 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Flamtiff-Respondent and Defendant-Appel-
!ant entered ~nto a contract in August of 1959 for 
\be la.ndscapi:1g of Appellant's home, the construc-
tion JT o. ~atio, and retaining wall. Contract price 
Na.s to De $893.00. Said agreement was signed on 
lQ August 1959, and immediately thereafter Respon-
dent began v10rk on the above-listed project. A short 
time after the signing of the contract, Appellant ex-
tended the ccntract to Respondent to include the 
construction of a cement cinder-block wall at the 
agreed price of $1,000.00. Subsequent to this, a 
further extension was entered into for the construc-
ticn of certam planter boxes running adjacent to 
the cement cinder-block wall. 
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Respondent completed the work outlined wilh 
the final capping of the cement wall in December 
of 1959. The lawn was planted approximately Octo 
ber 25, 1959, and failed to grow the following year. 
Appellant alleged that such failure was due to the 
poor workmanship of the Respondent, and Respon. 
dent alleged that it was due to the failure to water 
on the part of Appellant. 
Appellant paid Respondent $1,000.00. There was 
a balance due on the contract of $893.00. At pre- trial, 
Respondent admitted that the cement patio was not 
in excellent condition, as there was admittedly 3 
slight flaking of the top. Said matter having been 
admitted, no evidence to the contrary, the tnal 
court allowed an offset against the contract price of 
$50.00. 
During the construction and completion of th9 
above contract, Respondent was not a licens2d con 
tractor, as required by the provision of 58-23-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. The trial court held, how· 
ever, that Respondent came under the provisions 
of 58-23-2(6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, an ex· 
ception to the requirement for a contractor's license 
in that this was a contract of less than $1000.00 value, 
and as such was incidental and did not require that 
Respondent be licensed. 
It is from this decision that Appellant appeals 
to this Honorable Court. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CON-
TRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
EXCEPTION OF 58-23-2(6) APPLIES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CON-
TRACT WAS ENFORCEABLE. 
It has been uniformly held and appears to be 
the gene:;:-al law that where a license is required for 
t!ie carrying on of a business, that failure to obtain 
such license will make any contract entered into 
v.J1d and unenforceable. This general law appears 
ir 53 CJS, Section 59, p. 711: 
"A contract entered into by a person in the 
course of an occupation or business in which he 
is engaged without taking out a license or paying 
the license fee or tax as required by law is void 
and unenforceable where the statute or ordnance 
expressly vidiates such contracts or where it ex-
pressly prohibits the carryinl{ on of such occupa-
tion or busir>!!ss without a license, permit or ap-
proval, or the payment of the tax even though it 
does not expressly declare such contracts to be 
void." (Emphasis added) 
The general law, as outlined above, applies 
specifically to the situation covered by this appeal. 
Respondent was a contractor and was engaged to 
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perform construction work by the Appella t h . 
. Th R i . n e,e. 
m. ; ~sponaent did i:iot possess a valid C~n-
tractor s License, as provided by the statut . · 
h e, Jnr· as sue any contract entered into by Respo d ~ 
· 'd d n en, is vo1 an unenforceable. 
See Eklund v Elwell, 116, U 521, 211 P2d 84~· 
Olsen v Reese, 114 U 411, 200 P2d 733. · 
Under the provisions of 58-23-3(3), Utah Coss 
Annotated, 1953, wherein the word "contractor" is 
defined, it states that 
"any person, who for a fixed sum, price, fee, per-
centage, or other compensation other than wages, 
undertakes with another for the construction, alter· 
a ti on, repair, addition to, or improvement of any 
building, highway, road, railroad, excavation, or 
othe rstructure, project, development or improve-
ment other than to personalty or any part there· 
of; ... " 
The provisions of this statute are clearly regula· 
tory and of a police nature to protect the publ:c 
from unqualified contractors and are used as a 
means of regulation by the State. Appellant al· 
leges that had the work been satisfactory to him 
it would not have been necessary for him to reb 
upon the protection of said statute; that Appellar.1 
paid the Respondent for that work which was satls· 
factory and at the agreed price, and had clearlv 
shown his good faith in relying on the Respondent's 
ability as a contractor. However, when the work 
covered by the contract was not satisfactory, Ap-
pell::i.nt found it necessary to rely on the protection 
afforded him by the statutes of this State. 
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The contract entered into by the parties hereto 
was for the general beautification and improvement 
Jf the Appello.nt's land. Respondent held himself 
out to be a qualified and bona fide contractor with 
the r_ecessary equipment and ability. Appellant al-
leged that Respondent was not such, and that his 
mabihty -v,wrked a hardship on Appellant in that 
Aop2llant was required to obtain services of anoth-
o: qi_;_a~ifie:::l. and licensed contractor to rectify the 
work improperiy done under this contract. 
lt is, therefore, the contention of the Appellant 
tha+ it was an error on the part of the court to uphold 
his contract in that it should have been declared 
void and unenforceable. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
EXCEPTION OF 58-23-2(6) APPLIES. 
Section 58-23-2(6), Utah Code Annotated/ 1953. 
orovides that no license is required if: 
"on one undertaking or project by contracts or con-
tract performed directly or indirectly by one con-
tractor, the aggregate contract price for which, for 
labor, materials and all other items is less than 
$1.000.00 such work or operations being considered 
as of a casual, minor, or inconsequential nature." 
(Emphasis added) 
The court erred in h9lding that Respondent fell 
1·rHhin the provisions of)hJ9 ex~eption. 
From a reading of the above-cited provision of 
the TJtah Code Annotated, it is clear that this appeal 
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must necessarily revolve itself around this Court' 
definition of the terms "undertaking" and "project.~ 
It is clear from the evidence that a contract was 
entered into and modified twice. All of the wor~ 
covered by the contract and modifications were Ji. 
ter-related in that they were all part and parcel of the 
beautification and improvement of Appellant's land. 
The contract was signed April 10th and was extend 
ed a short time later. 
This agreement, in aggregate, was well over 
$1,000.00, and, therefore, the only exception which 
possibly could be allowed would be that this ls 
more than one project or undertaking. 
A careful search of the legislative history fai'.s 
to indicate what the intent of the legislature was as i 
to what was to constitute one "undertaking" or 
"project." Further no clear definition has been ex-
tended by any court of competent jurisdiction in 
this state or any neighboring state, and there ap· 1 
pears to be a dearth of authority in this area of th~ 1 
law. 
The question. therefore, becomes one of d~ 
termininq what is meant in this statute bv the w~rd 
"project." The work agreed upon by the part:es 
d · nd 1111· hereto was for the general lan scapmg a , 
, d Respondent · provement of Appellant s groun 5· h'l 
agreed to the contract, began his work, and w 1 ~ 
still on the premises with equipment and .~en.an 
proceeding as agreed, was extended mod1ficatrons , 
which related to the contract. All of the workdwa: 
of the same general type. All of the work was on 
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by one contractor. All was done for the Appellant. 
There was no great break in time. All was for one 
purpose - the beautification and betterment of Ap-
pellant's lot. 
The Court held that project was to be deter-
mined by what was in the minds of the parties at 
the outset. Yet, the Court had difficulty in holding 
this was all more than one project. On page 228 
of the transcript, the Court held that this was all one 
projecr, and then a few pages later, held that this 
was more than one project and therefore fell within 
the provisions of the exception. (See page 235). 
If the definition of the word "project" is to be 
determined by the plan, as outlined at the outset, 
the way is open for all types of circumvention by 
both parties as was outlined by the court. It is the 
contention of the Appellant that the determination 
should be from all of the circumstances involved 
m the entire transaction. All of this is clear from the 
circ:ur:cstances outlined above. The type of work 
should be taken into account, along with the time 
and place, as well as the knowledge of the parties. 
Here the circumstances point clearly to a determin-
ation that this was all one project. 
The Respondent accepted the construction of 
the cement block wall a short time after he began 
work on the lawn. He stopped work on the lawn 
and proceeded with the fence. After completing the 
fence, he returned to finish the lawn. Appellant 
respectively submits that this clearly shows the in-
terrelationship of the work, as they were depen-
dent and continuous, so that they were all one pro;-
ect, as such the Respondent should not be allowed 
to circumvent the law by claiming the exemption. 
The aggregate price was almost $1,900.00, and could 
not be considered casual in nature, and the cour'. 
erred in so holding. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that the court 
erred in holding the contract enforceable, and, 
further, that the circumstances are such thal the 
court erred in holding this to be more thar. one 
project. 
WHEREFORE, we respectfully request the Hor:-
orable Court reverse the judgment heretofore en-
tered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted 
THOMAS P. VUYK, 
Attorney for Appellam 
